In order to determine whether the issue of the moment was a question of “capacity to arbitrate” or whether it was otherwise “outside” the agreement and thus for a court, the District Court considered the entire language of the arbitration clause, which expressly excluded certain issues from the arbitration, such as the use of contractors or the exercise of the company`s right to dismiss after notification. Both are matters of substantive arbitration. In applying the principles of contract interpretation, it was found that the language of the CBA applied only to the substantive capacity to arbitrate and did not supersede the general rule that the procedural capacity for arbitration rests with the arbitrator. Since the underlying dispute relating to the worker`s dismissal was the subject of arbitration proceedings, the question of the time of the request for arbitration was more appropriate before the arbitrator. The tribunal recognized that a tribunal could refuse arbitration proceedings if the provision of the procedure in question prohibited arbitration as a whole, but there was nothing in the arbitration clause to indicate that the temporal provisions completely excluded arbitration proceedings. On appeal, the Ninth Circle overturned the District Court`s decision. Instead, he stated that “as long as there is an arbitration agreement between demanding parties to trade agreements, those parties are expected to understand that the inclusion of the UNCITRAL rules delegates to the arbitrator the issues of arbitration capacity.” In the maritime context, as is the case here, the Tribunal has argued that the quintessence of the broad arbitration clause applies by its words to “all disputes arising out of the charter contract”, while the typical narrow clause deals specifically with disputes “between owners and charterers” and applies only to disputes between the parties mentioned in the clause. In this regard, the Tribunal concluded that the applicable arbitration clause expressly limited disputes “between the owner and the charterer” and was therefore restrictive and could not extend to petitioners who were neither “owners” nor “charterers” within the meaning of the contract. Finding that the respondents had not met the second requirement of the analysis, the Tribunal refused to respond to the first. The petitioners filed an action in the U.S.

District Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, and the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C§ 1-16, to order (1) arbitration proceedings already commenced against it by the respondent; and (2) to declare that there was no valid arbitration agreement between the parties. The petitioners who were not signatories to the Charter agreement in question denied having entered into a valid agreement that would require them to arbitrate with the respondent. The Regional Court agreed. In contrast, Oracle is Am., Inc. v. . .